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NOTES
THE ALASKA MISCONDUCT
INVOLVING WEAPONS STATUTES:
A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
This Note examines the Alaska Misconduct Involving Weapons
statutes, concentrating on their history and on two  Alaska Court
of Appeals decisions interpreting them.  The Note also considers
the federal statute upon which the Alaska statutes and their
judicial interpretations are based.  Finally, the Note invites the
Alaska Legislature to respond to the court’s decisions by
amending and clarifying the statutes.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the Alaska Court of Appeals decided Murray v. State.1
In Murray, the court of appeals interpreted Alaska Statute section
11.61.195, which prohibits the possession of a weapon while
committing a number of specified drug offenses.2  Drawing upon its
previous decision in Collins v. State,3 the court laid out a set of
factors to assist a trial court in determining whether a nexus
between a weapon and an underlying offense has been proven
under the statute.4  These factors were taken from a series of
federal appellate cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).5
Copyright © 2003 by John D. Fred.  This Note is also available on the Internet at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/20ALRFred.
The author is a member of the Class of 2004 at Duke University School of Law
and serves as an Executive Editor of the Alaska Law Review.  The author would
like to extend special thanks to his wife, Ann Marie, for her unending support and
patience.
1. 54 P.3d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.195 (Michie 2002).
3. 977 P.2d 741, 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (holding that prosecution must
prove a “nexus” between the weapon and the predicate drug offense).
4. Murray, 54 P.3d at 824; see also discussion infra Part V.
5. Murray, 54 P.3d at 824 n.17; see also discussion infra Part V.
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This Note asserts that, for better or worse, the Murray court
implied that the federal and state statutes, while differing slightly,
should essentially be interpreted in the same manner.  Accordingly,
in order for practitioners, judges, and legislators to understand how
the case will affect Alaska jurisprudence, a fundamental
understanding of the federal statute is needed.  This Note sets out
the texts, legislative histories, and interpretive jurisprudences of
each statute, and compares the substantive points of the statutes.
Next, the Note analyzes Murray in detail, paying special attention
to the federal decisions that spawned the factors cited by the
Alaska court.  Finally, the Note encourages the legislature to
clarify its intent by amending the statute or by announcing that the
court of appeals’ interpretation is indeed consistent with the
legislature’s actual intent.
II.  ALASKA’S MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS STATUTES
A. Statutory Framework
In 1992, the Alaska Legislature enacted the Anti-Violent
Crime Act.6  Section 10 of this Act changed the title of the existing
misconduct involving weapons statute to Misconduct Involving
Weapons in the Third Degree and inserted the more serious crimes
of Misconduct Involving Weapons in the First Degree and
Misconduct Involving Weapons in the Second Degree.7 In
pertinent part, the Act provided:
AS 11.61 is amended by adding new sections to article 2 to read:
Sec. 11.61.190. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN
THE FIRST DEGREE.
(a) A person commits the crime of misconduct involving
weapons in the first degree if the person uses or attempts to use
a firearm during the commission of an offense under AS
11.71.010 - 11.71.040.
(b) Misconduct involving weapons in the first degree is a class A
felony.
Sec. 11.61.195. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING WEAPONS IN
THE SECOND DEGREE.
(a) A person commits the crime of misconduct involving
weapons in the second degree if the person knowingly
(1) possesses a firearm during the commission of an offense
under AS 11.71.010 - 11.71.040; or
6. 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 79.
7. Id.; see also State v. McLaughlin, 860 P.2d 1270, 1271 n.1 (Alaska 1993).
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(2) violates AS 11.61.200(a)(1) and is within the grounds of or on
a parking lot immediately adjacent to
(A) a public or private preschool, elementary, junior high, or
secondary school without the permission of the chief
administrative officer of the school or district or the designee of
the chief administrative officer; or
(B) a center, other than a private residence, licensed under AS
47.35.010 - 47.35.075 or recognized by the federal government
for the care of children.
(b) Misconduct involving weapons in the second degree is a class
B felony.8
These provisions can be classified as the Alaska “use statute”
(section 11.61.190(a)) and the Alaska “possession statute” (section
11.61.195(a)(1)).9  The parts of the statutes with which this Note is
concerned—the actual “use” and “possession” components—apply
to certain drug-related violations of the Alaska criminal code,
including delivery, manufacture, and possession of certain
controlled substances.10  Despite small technical changes to the
statutes themselves, the use and possession components have
remained identical to their original enactments.11
B. Judicial Interpretation
1. The Court’s Initial Reading: Collins v. State.  Judicial
interpretation of the Alaska weapons statute has been limited,
especially with regard to the use statute.12  However, the court of
appeals has recently been very active in interpreting the possession
statute.13  The court’s first chance to consider the possession statute
8. 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 79.
9. By enacting both a use statute and a possession statute, the Alaska
Legislature avoided many of the problems that have arisen in the analogous
federal provisions.  See infra Part VI.  In addition, for the purposes of this Note,
the use and possession statutes are collectively termed the “Alaska weapons
statute.”
10. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.010-.040 (Michie 2002).
11. See id.
12. As of this writing, no Alaska court has interpreted or considered the
provision of the use statute discussed in this Note (use of a firearm during the
commission of a drug offense).  However, at least one decision has considered the
prosecution’s obligations under ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.190(a), which punishes the
discharge of a firearm from a propelled vehicle under certain circumstances.  See
Smith v. State, 28 P.3d 323, 326 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
13. This Note focuses on the judicial interpretation of the possession statute,
but it also discusses some options for the legislature and the courts.  See infra Part
VI.
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came in Collins v. State.14  In Collins, a defendant was arrested
when Anchorage police responded to an anonymous tip that drug
sales were occurring in a certain apartment.15  During their search,
the police found the defendant and two other people.16  In the
defendant’s room, the police also found two handguns, various
drug paraphernalia, and a drug-sale record.17  The defendant was
subsequently convicted under section 11.61.195 on the basis that he
simultaneously possessed the firearms and the drugs.18  Indeed, the
jury was instructed that, in order to convict the defendant under
the possession statute, the State needed only to establish that the
event actually occurred and that the defendant “knowingly
possessed a firearm during the commission of a felony drug
offense . . . .”19  The jury, however, received no further explanation
pertaining to the phrase “during the commission of a felony drug
offense.”20
After his conviction, the defendant filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the statute required proof of
some connection between the firearm and the drug offense.21  The
trial judge expressed preliminary agreement with the defendant’s
interpretation of the statute and asked the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on the subject.22  In its brief, the State
conceded that the statute required proof of a nexus between, not
just simultaneous possession of, drugs and a firearm.23  However,
the State argued that as long as the defendant was “emboldened”
by the presence and availability of the firearm, proof of use or
threatened use was not required.24  The State also argued that the
fact that the drugs and guns were found in the same location
effectively proved a nexus between them.25  The trial judge denied
the defendant’s motion.26
14. 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
15. Id. at 744.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 751 (Mannheimer, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 752.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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The court of appeals reversed the trial judge’s ruling.27
Specifically, the court found that because the State conceded that
the statute required proof of an additional element (or nexus), the
indictment lacked a necessary element.28  In addition, the court
held that if a nexus were an element, the jury should have been
instructed as to the nexus requirement and should have made a
finding as to that element.29  Since neither event occurred at
Collins’ trial, the conviction was flawed, regardless of whether the
State adequately proved a nexus.30  Furthermore, the court of
appeals rejected the State’s contention that a crime under section
11.61.195 is committed whenever someone “simultaneously
commits a drug felony and possesses or exercises control over a
firearm—even a firearm located in another place.”31  In doing so,
the court noted that the State’s interpretation would drastically
increase sentences whenever a drug user happened to be a gun
owner.32  Accordingly, the court concluded that section
11.61.195(a)(1) required proof of a “nexus between a defendant’s
possession of the firearm and the defendant’s commission of the
felony drug offense.”33  However, the court specifically declined to
define the contours of the nexus.34
2. The Court’s Latest Opinion: Murray v. State.  The court of
appeals received its opportunity to define the nexus in Murray v.
State.35  In Murray, officers responded to a defendant’s hotel room
in search of a dead body.36  Instead of a dead body, however, the
officers found the defendant, who claimed that his girlfriend was
currently in possession of cocaine and was driving around town in
his car.37  When the officers stopped the car, they contacted the
defendant, who consented to a search of the car.38  During the
27. Id. at 752-53.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 752.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 753 (noting that the state had claimed that “the only nexus required
by the statute is one [of] time: possession [of the firearm] must coincide at some
point in time with the commission of a felony drug offense[]”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 54 P.3d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
36. Id. at 822.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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search, the officers uncovered marijuana and a crack pipe.39  The
defendant subsequently arrived at the traffic stop and volunteered
that he had given his girlfriend the marijuana.40  In addition, he
claimed that he had about a quarter-pound of marijuana and a
handgun located at his residence.41
After obtaining a warrant, the officers searched the
defendant’s residence.42  They found marijuana in a living room
closet, marijuana measuring and sorting materials in the kitchen,
marijuana residue in a bedroom drawer, and a loaded .44 magnum
handgun in the bedside table drawer.43  In addition, they found a
gun cleaning kit and boxes of ammunition in a bucket in the
bedroom and a marijuana “bud” in the weapon’s case.44 The
defendant was tried and convicted of multiple offenses, including
one count of Misconduct Involving Weapons in the Second Degree
under section 11.61.195(a)(1).45  Originally, the trial judge made no
specific findings as to the nexus between the drugs and the
weapon.46  However, the court of appeals remanded the case to the
trial court to enter specific findings on the nexus issue.47
On remand, the trial court stated that its original findings
encompassed the nexus issue.48  The court emphasized these facts:
that the marijuana had been found in the same bedroom as the
firearm and that the defendant had bought the firearm to protect
his marijuana “stash.”49  Furthermore, the trial court claimed that
the presence of the firearm “emboldened” the defendant to
maintain his marijuana stash by making his home more secure.50
Finally, the court noted that the “substantial amount of drugs”
involved in the case, as well as “the defendant’s status as a felon,”
led to the conclusion that the nexus requirement was satisfied.51
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
      45.  Id. 
46. Id.  The trial judge based his decision on the fact that some “logical
correlation” existed between the drugs and the weapon.  Id.  Specifically, the
judge noted that “the place where the drugs were located was also the place where
the firearm was located.”  Id.
47. Id. at 822-23.
48. Id. at 823.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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On appeal of the trial court’s order, the court of appeals
vacated the trial court’s decision.52  The court found that the trial
court’s factual findings were erroneous because the trial judge had
based his ruling in part on the fact that the drugs and the firearm
were found in the same room of the house.53  In actuality, however,
the drugs were found in the living room and the firearm was found
in the bedroom.54 Because the proximity of the firearm was
relevant to the nexus determination, the court of appeals remanded
the case for reconsideration of the nexus issue.55
In the second part of its opinion, the court of appeals analyzed
the legal standard used by the trial court.56  At trial and on remand,
the trial judge found that a nexus was established because the drugs
and the firearm were in close physical proximity and because the
firearm “emboldened” the defendant to continue his drug
possession.57  Further, in its brief to the court of appeals, the State
argued that there is always a sufficient nexus under the possession
statute whenever someone possesses drugs and a firearm in close
physical proximity.58  The court of appeals dismissed this argument,
noting that a test based only on physical proximity would trigger
liability under the possession statute any time a party commits a
drug offense in their residence and also possesses a firearm in their
residence, regardless of the reason for gun possession.59  The court
also stated that the State’s argument would be contrary to the
court’s notion of the legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.60
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that, to establish a sufficient
nexus to trigger liability under the possession statute, the State is
required to prove that the defendant’s possession of a firearm
“aided, advanced, or furthered the commission of the drug
offense.”61
52. Id. at 825.
53. Id. at 823.
54. Id.  The State conceded this fact on appeal.  Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 823-24.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 824. This is a very similar argument to the one advanced by the State
in Collins.  See Collins v. State, 977 P.2d 741, 752 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).  Instead
of arguing that simultaneous possession always proves a nexus, the State in
Murray argued that close physical proximity always proves a nexus.  54 P.3d at
824.
59. Murray, 54 P.3d at 824.
60. Id.
61. Id. (rejecting the “close physical proximity” test as a sufficient condition
for liability under the possession statute).
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To assist trial courts in determining whether a nexus exists, the
court of appeals proposed a multi-factor test based upon certain
federal circuit court decisions.62  In doing so, the court of appeals
inextricably linked its interpretation of section 11.61.195 to
relevant federal case law.  These factors and their origins will be
discussed more thoroughly in Part V. However, to better
understand the framework that produced the factors, a discussion
of the pertinent federal law is required.  The meandering road that
Congress and the federal courts have followed in interpreting the
federal statute also shows the difficulties that can arise when
legislative intent is not clear.  Finally, the federal law provides a
framework for analyzing the Alaska use statute, which to date has
not been interpreted by Alaska courts.
III.  THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK: 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)
A. The Original Enactment
In 1968, Congress enacted the Gun Control Act.63  The Act
contained a provision, later codified at 18 U.S.C § 924(c), which
stated that “[w]hoever uses a firearm to commit any felony . . . or
carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any
felony . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less
than one year nor more than 10 years.”64  As a general matter, the
statute was intended “to persuade the man who is tempted to
commit a Federal felony to leave his gun at home.”65  The statute,
however, did not apply to many criminal acts because it was
inapplicable to situations where the defendant had a permit for the
weapon or refrained from using the weapon to commit the crime.66
In addition, the Supreme Court initially held that the statute
functioned only as an “enhancement provision” rather than as a
separate offense.67
Congress responded to these attacks with a series of
amendments over a ten-year period.  The first amendment (and the
62. Id. at 823-24.
63. Angela LaBuda Collins, Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C. §
924(c): Congressional Reaction to the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Statute,
48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1319, 1325 (1999) (internal citation omitted).
64. Danielle D. Giroux, Note, My Dictionary or Yours?  The Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of “Carrying” Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)(1) in Muscarello v. United
States, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 355, 356 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
65. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (quoting 114 CONG.
REC. 22,231 (1968) (statement of Rep. Poff) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66. Giroux, supra note 64, at 356-57.
67. Collins, supra note 63, at 1326.
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most direct response) was enacted as a component of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.68  This enactment
instituted a mandatory five-year sentence without parole under §
924(c) for any defendant who “carried firearms during, and in
relation to,” a crime of violence.69  The amendment also removed
the “unlawful” carrying requirement, thus bringing within the grasp
of § 924(c) those cases in which a defendant lawfully possessed a
firearm but carried it in the commission of a crime.70  Accordingly,
under the 1984 amendment, a defendant could “carry” a firearm if
he “had a gun in his pocket, but did not display it, or refer to it.”71
Subsequent amendments broadened § 924(c) to include drug
trafficking crimes.  Congress enacted another amendment to §
924(c) in 1986 as part of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act.72
This amendment made § 924(c) applicable to drug trafficking
crimes as well as crimes of violence.73 The amendment also
reflected the overarching and now universally-recognized purpose
of § 924(c): “to combat the ‘dangerous combination’ of ‘drugs and
guns.’”74  Congress modified the definition of “drug trafficking
crime” in 1988, defining the term as “any felony punishable under
the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801), the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. § 951), or the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. § 1901).”75
Finally, in 1990 and 1994, Congress expanded the list of weapons
covered under the statute.76
B. Judicial Interpretation of the “Uses or Carries” Standard and
the Congressional Response
1. Smith v. United States and the “Use” Prong.  In 1993, the
Supreme Court made its first attempt to probe the depths of the
“use” prong of § 924(c).77  In Smith,78 a defendant was charged and
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1327.
70. Giroux, supra note 66, at 357.
71. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 314 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
72. Collins, supra note 67, at 1328.
73. See Giroux, supra note 66, at 357.
74. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (quoting Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)).
75. H. REP. NO. 105-344, at 3 n.2 (1997).
76. Collins, supra note 63, at 1328.  For a complete list of covered weapons,
see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) (2000).
77. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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convicted under § 924(c) for exchanging a MAC-10 automatic
firearm for a quantity of cocaine.79  On appeal, the defendant
argued that § 924(c)’s proscription against using a firearm “during
and in relation to” a drug trafficking offense was only applicable
when the firearm was used as a weapon, not as a medium of
exchange.80  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s
argument, holding that “any use of ‘the weapon to facilitate in any
manner the commission of the offense’” was sufficient to trigger
liability under § 924(c).81
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the defendant’s claim
by noting that § 924(c) requires the prosecution to show both that
the defendant “use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm” and that he or she did
so “during and in relation to” a “crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime.”82  The Court then held that the language
contained in § 924(c)(1) was broad enough to punish any use of a
firearm, provided that such use was “during and in relation to” a
drug trafficking offense or crime of violence.83  Accordingly, the
manner in which the defendant used the Mac-10 is immaterial if he
used it “during and in relation to” his cocaine-related offenses.
Turning to the “during and in relation to” element, the Court
held that an act cannot support punishment under § 924(c)(1)
unless, at a minimum, “it facilitates or furthers the drug crime.”84
This construction is aligned with the purpose of the “in relation to”
language, which was designed to allay concerns that a person could
be charged under § 924(c)(1) even though their possession of a
firearm was “coincidental or entirely unrelated” to a drug offense.85
In the specific case, the fact that the defendant’s use of the MAC-
10 was “integral” to the transaction clearly indicated that the
weapon’s presence facilitated the drug offense.86  Accordingly, the
defendant’s conviction under § 924(c) was proper.87
2. Bailey v. United States: The Turning Point.  After Smith,
confusion developed among the circuit courts as to how “use”
78. Id.
79. Id. at 225-27.
80. Id. at 227.
81. Id (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 227-28.
83. Id. at 229.
84. Id. at 232.
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 241.
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should be defined in situations other than a guns-for-drugs trade.88
Specifically, although Smith had defined “use” under § 924(c) as
“employment,” some circuit courts differed as to whether mere
“possession” of a weapon was sufficient to trigger criminal
liability.89  In order to rectify this inconsistency and to resolve the
circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bailey v.
United States.90
Bailey consisted of two cases that were consolidated by the
District of Columbia Circuit in a rehearing en banc.91  In the first
case, United States v. Bailey, a defendant was charged and
convicted under § 924(c)(1) when officers executing a traffic stop
found cocaine and a round of ammunition in the defendant’s car
and a loaded pistol in his trunk.92  In the second case, United States
v. Robinson, a defendant was arrested and convicted when officers
found an unloaded weapon and some drug paraphernalia in her
bedroom closet.93
Prior to these consolidated cases, two theories existed among
the federal circuits for defining the “use” prong of § 924(c)(1).94
The first theory (the “drug fortress” theory) held that the presence
of a firearm for the maintenance or protection of a “drug fortress”
was sufficient to trigger criminal liability under the “use” prong of
§ 924(c)(1).95  The theory extended to “mere possession” cases in
which the firearm had a future possibility of aggressive use.96  In
addition, the theory was extended in the Fifth Circuit to include
cases in which firearms and drugs were possessed on the same
premises at the same time.97
The second theory was the “ready access” theory.  Under this
theory, a defendant could be convicted of “using” a firearm under
§ 924(c)(1) if he or she intended to have the firearm available for
88. Collins, supra note 63, at 1334.
89. Id.
90. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
91. Id. at 141.
92. Id. at 139.
93. Id. at 140.
94. Julie D. Bettenhausen, Note, The Implications of Bailey v. United States
on the Rise of Convicted Criminal Claims and the Fall of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 46
DRAKE L. REV. 677, 682 (1998).
95. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 141.
96. Id.; see also United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 465 (1st Cir. 1994).
97. Bettenhausen, supra note 94, at 683; see also United States v. Blake, 941
F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d 1417 (5th
Cir. 1989).  Recall that this was very similar to the state’s contention in Collins v.
State.  977 P.2d 741, 752 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
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use during a drug transaction or if the firearm was strategically
located so as to be quickly and readily accessible during a drug
transaction.98
The District of Columbia Circuit produced a third theory.  In
its en banc rehearing of the cases, a majority of the court adopted a
“proximity and accessibility” test.99  This test was effectively
defined as a “proximity plus” test, under which defendants were
subject to liability for “use” of a weapon during and in relation to a
drug trafficking offense when they put or kept the gun in a
particular place from which the defendant (or his or her agent)
could gain access to it to facilitate a drug crime.100  Thus, mere
possession of a weapon was not enough to convict a defendant
under § 924(c)(1).101
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court agreed that “use”
meant more than mere possession of a firearm by a drug offender,
holding that if Congress had intended to punish mere possession, it
would have done so.102  However, the Court struck down the
“proximity and accessibility” test, holding that under that test
almost any type of possession of a firearm by a person engaged in
drug trafficking would be sufficient to convict a defendant.103  The
Court concluded that the “language, context, and history” of §
924(c) indicated that “active employment” of a weapon was
required to violate the “use” prong.104  The Court also rejected the
Government’s contention that “use” encompassed the actions of a
defendant who places a gun in a position to protect drugs or to
“embolden” himself.105  Under that theory, the meaning of the word
“carry” in the statute would be rendered superfluous or
redundant.106  The Court was unable to accept that outcome, and
instead proposed a construction of “use” that would not undermine
the definition of “carry.”107  Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
98. Bettenhausen, supra note 94, at 683-84; see also United States v.
Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859
F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1988).
99. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 141.
100. Id. at 142.
101. Id. at 143.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 143-44.
104. Id. at 144.
105. Id. at 145.  Recall that this was essentially the trial judge’s rationale for
determining that the defendant “possessed” a weapon during the commission of a
drug crime in Murray v. State.  54 P.3d 821, 823 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
106. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145.
107. Id. at 146.  Under the Court’s interpretation, a firearm would fit the
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the Court again observed that if Congress had intended to strip
“use” of its “active connotations” or to render “carry” redundant,
it could have done so by instituting a possession standard.108
3. Congress responds to Bailey.  Bailey had a profound effect
on federal criminal law.  Prosecutions under § 924(c) were
decreased by one-half in the first month following the decision.109
Additionally, between 1,500 and 2,250 § 924(c) prosecutions were
disqualified per year by Bailey, leading to approximately a
seventeen percent decline in prosecutions under the statute.110  The
decision also led to a rash of litigation in lower courts due to the
Court’s retroactive application of its decision.111
Rather than accept Bailey as a valid exercise of the Court’s
constitutional power, Congress reacted relatively quickly and
condemned the Court’s “limited interpretation” of the use prong.112
Congress viewed Bailey as a fetter to prosecutors and as a weapon
that “drug dealers and other bad actors” could use to get out of
jail.113  As a result, both houses of Congress introduced bills
designed to rectify the “Bailey problem” and clarify the
congressional intent behind § 924(c).114  The proposals, however,
were not identical.  The House approach (the first to be
introduced) entirely deleted the “uses or carries” language of the
statute and instead punished those defendants who brandished or
discharged firearms, as well as those who possessed firearms in
furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense.115
This bill was therefore designed to defeat the “restrictive effect” of
definition of “use,” but not that of “carry,” when a defendant displays the gun
during a transaction (for instance, when a defendant barters with a firearm
without handling it) or carries the firearm without being used (for example when
an offender conceals a weapon during a transaction).  Id.
108. Id. at 146-48.
109. Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun
Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors,
51 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1672-73 (2002).
110. Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes
Involving Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 41, 60-61 (2000); see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 5 (1997).
111. Beale, supra note 109, at 1673.  More than ten-thousand people were in
prison for § 924(c) violations at the time Bailey was handed down.  Id.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 4.
113. 144 CONG. REC. H10330 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
114. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 6.
115. Id. at 3.
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Bailey.116  The Senate bill, while similar to the House version,
retained the “uses or carries” language and added a possession
standard.117  The Senate was deeply committed to rectifying the
conflict between the branches, and Senator Jesse Helms, the
sponsor of the bill, went so far as to claim that Congress was
“morally obliged” to fix the Bailey “blunder.”118 Helms and other
senators referred to their version as the “Bailey Fix Act.”119
In the past, members of Congress had tried to introduce
“possession” language into § 924(c), but had been met with limited
success.120  However, Bailey served as the proverbial last straw, and
the Senate’s version of the amendment to § 924(c) passed both
houses in 1998.121  Under the amendment, designed to “throttle
criminal use of guns,” the statute was extended to reach conduct
occurring outside of the “uses or carries” standard by punishing
“possession in furtherance of” a violent crime or drug trafficking
crime.122  While instituting a change in the underlying law, Congress
also made it clear that the possession standard had limits.
Specifically, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that to
convict under the “possession in furtherance of” standard, the
government must show that the firearm was possessed to “advance
or promote” the commission of the offense.123  Accordingly, the
statute was limited to criminal activity and was not intended to
reach self-defense actions or situations where a weapon was
possessed in the general vicinity of a criminal act.124
4. The Wild Card: Muscarello v. United States.  While
Congress was debating the 1998 amendment to § 924(c), the
Supreme Court decided Muscarello v. United States.125  In
Muscarello, the Court considered the extent of the “carry” prong of
§ 924(c).126  The defendants in Muscarello (two consolidated cases)
claimed that, because the weapons at issue in their cases were
116. Collins, supra note 63, at 1348.
117. Id. at 1348.
118. Id. at 1349.
119. Id.
120. See Giroux, supra note 64, at 358 (noting that, as early as 1990, the Senate
had attempted to replace the “uses or carries” language with “possession”
language).
121. Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)).
122. Id.
123. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 12 (1997).
124. Id.
125. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
126. Id. at 126.
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found in the glove compartment and trunk of the defendants’
vehicles, respectively, § 924(c) did not apply to their conduct.127
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that § 924(c) was not
limited to situations where a defendant “carries” a firearm on their
person.128  Rather, the Court held that § 924(c) applied to situations
in which a person “knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a
vehicle,” regardless of where in the vehicle the weapon actually is
located.129  On its face, it would seem that this language effectively
extended § 924(c) to include the types of conduct that Congress
was trying to reach when it enacted the 1998 amendment.130
However, Congress paid no attention to Muscarello when enacting
the amendment.131  This may have occurred because Congress
wished to reach situations such as the one at issue in Murray: those
cases where the defendant has a weapon on the premises where he
or she conducts drug operations.  Since no “carrying” actually
occurs in that case, a “possession” standard would be needed to
reach that conduct.
IV.  A BRIEF ASIDE: WHY REQUIRE A NEXUS?
Because of the relatively interrelated nature of drug crimes
and firearms, a statute that punishes the use or possession of a
firearm while committing a drug offense sweeps a great deal of
conduct within its ambit.  This is effectively demonstrated by §
924(c), which is the most frequently prosecuted federal firearms
statute.132  The federal statute also imposes enhanced penalties or
institutes separate offenses for conduct that normally would be
punished under only one offense.133  As a result, prosecutors have
an incentive to apply § 924(c) tenaciously and to try, whenever
possible, to expand its reach by broadly interpreting its
requirements.134  A nexus, then, is required to provide a check on
prosecutorial overreaching.
127. Id. at 127.
128. Id. at 126.
129. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
130. Collins, supra note 63, at 1349-50.
131. Id. at 1350.
132. Beale, supra note 109, at 1665-66.
133. Id. at 1667.
134. Id. at 1675.
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V.  ALASKA’S FRAMEWORK FOR ESTABLISHING A
NEXUS UNDER SECTION 11.61.195
In Murray, the Alaska Court of Appeals reiterated that a
nexus between a defendant’s possession of a firearm and his
commission of a drug offense is required for conviction under
section 11.61.195.135  To aid fact-finders in determining whether a
nexus exists, the court set out a list of factors that federal circuit
courts have found “relevant” in determining whether a firearm was
possessed in furtherance of a drug offense under § 924(c).136  These
factors are:
(1) the type of drug activity conducted; (2) the accessibility of
the firearm; (3) the type of firearm; (4) whether the firearm was
stolen; (5) the status of the defendant’s possession (legitimate or
illegal); (6) whether the firearm was loaded; (7) the proximity of
the firearm to the drugs or drug profits; and (8) the time and
circumstances under which the gun was found.137
While the court cautioned that these factors were not exhaustive, it
also specifically stated that the factors were relevant to whether
“the defendant’s possession of [a] firearm aided, advanced, or
furthered the commission of the drug offense.”138
While many states do require some sort of nexus between a
weapon and a drug crime to convict, Alaska was one of the first to
use a factor-based analysis.139  At the time of Murray, Louisiana
was the only other state utilizing such a factor-based approach, and
even then only used the factors in cases where actual possession of
a firearm was not present.140  Additionally, while Kentucky adhered
to the rule that a nexus between the weapon and the drug offense
was required to convict, the standard only applied to cases of actual
135. Murray v. State, 54 P.3d 821, 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montague, 23 S.W.3d 629, 632-33 (Ky. 2000);
State v. Peete, 517 N.W.2d 149 (Wis. 1994).  States with statutes that specifically
include a standard have not found a need for any judicial nexus analysis.  See, e.g.,
Manning v. State, 956 S.W.2d 184 (Ark. 1997) (holding that, in order to convict
under the Arkansas statute, the firearm must be “in close approximation to the
defendant or within defendant’s easy reach”).
140. State v. Blanchard, 776 So. 2d 1165, 1173 (La. 2001).  The Louisiana court
also instituted a slightly different set of factors: “(1) the type of firearm involved;
(2) the type of controlled dangerous substance involved; (3) the quantity of drugs
involved; (4) the proximity of the firearm to the drugs; (5) whether the firearm is
loaded; and (6) any other relevant evidence.”  Id.  The “any other relevant
evidence” factor would seem to eliminate the concerns that the Murray court had
about the exhaustiveness of a factor-based test.
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possession.141  In contrast, Alaska’s factor-based framework seems
to apply to both cases of actual possession and cases of constructive
possession.
A. The Murray Factors
The Murray factors originated with United States v. Ceballos-
Torres.142  Ceballos-Torres appears to be the first federal appeals
case dealing with the 1998 amendment to § 924(c), and in it the
Fifth Circuit struggled with the true meaning of “in furtherance.”143
Much like the Murray court did two years later, the Ceballos-
Torres court adopted the dictionary definition of “in furtherance”:
“[the] act of furthering, advancing, or helping forward.”144  The
court then listed five ways in which a gun could “further, advance,
or help a drug trafficking.”145  First, the court noted that a gun
provides a defense for drug traffickers against those who might
attempt to steal the dealer’s drug stash or profits.146  Second, a gun
would serve a significant deterrent purpose because the knowledge
that one carries a gun will substantially lessen the chances that
anyone would wish to attempt to rob that person.147  Third, having a
gun at the ready during any deal can protect the dealer in case the
deal fails.148  Fourth, in accord with the deterrence interest in
carrying a gun, the availability of a gun during a transaction may
lessen the chance that the deal will fail.149  Finally, the gun may
allow a drug trafficker to defend his or her “turf” against other
dealers.150
Recognizing that the dictionary definition was correct and that
Congress did not intend the “in furtherance of” standard to reach
purely incidental possession, the Fifth Circuit held that proof of a
nexus required evidence that was “more specific to the particular
defendant” and that “show[ed] that his or her possession actually
furthered the drug trafficking offense.”151  The court then
introduced the factors subsequently adopted by the Murray court
and noted that the factors helped to “distinguish different types of
141. Montague, 23 S.W.3d at 632.
142. 218 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000).
143. Id. at 412.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 414-15.
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firearm possession.”152  Accordingly, the factors would probably
counsel that neither a drug dealer who collects and displays
unloaded antique firearms nor one who possesses firearms for
target shooting or for hunting game possesses firearms “in
furtherance” of drug trafficking.153  After detailing the factors and
their optimal result, the Fifth Circuit claimed that its dictionary
definition was the best way to resolve the ambiguity created by
Congress.154
The Ceballos-Torres court’s formulation of the “in furtherance
standard” was soon almost universally adopted among the circuit
courts.155  However, the adoption of this standard has not produced
unanimity in analysis, as some courts have provided different slants
on the overarching rule.  For example, the Tenth Circuit has
claimed that its standard for determining whether a firearm was
possessed “in furtherance of” a drug offense is some “direct
connection” between the firearm and the offense.156  This standard
created some conflict between itself and the factors set out in
Ceballos-Torres.157  The Tenth Circuit helped rectify this tension to
a certain degree by holding that the Ceballos-Torres factors are, at
the very least, “relevant and helpful.”158  In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit held that under Ceballos-Torres a firearm must be
“strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for
use” in order to be subject to the “possession” prong of § 924(c).159
B. Case-by-case Application of the Murray/Ceballos-Torres
Factors
The Murray/Ceballos-Torres factors offer limited guidance
regarding the outcome of future cases.  At the outset, it should be
noted that, under the House Judiciary Committee’s conception of
the “in furtherance” standard, the evidence presented by the
government in Bailey would probably not have been sufficient to
convict.160  Further, in Ceballos-Torres, the defendant was found
152. Id.
153. Id. at 415.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wahl,
290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th
Cir. 2001); United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001).
156. United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001).
157. Basham, 268 F.3d at 1207.
158. Id. at 1208.
159. Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462 (citation omitted).
160. Id. (citation omitted).
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guilty when his weapon was loaded, possessed illegally, and easily
accessible in his apartment along with a substantial amount of
money.161  Similarly, two other courts have upheld convictions
where the defendants possessed illegal and easily accessible
firearms in close proximity to drugs, drug paraphernalia, or large
amounts of cash in their dwelling place.162  This analysis, however, is
not limited to the home.  In one case, a defendant’s conviction
under the factors as applied to § 924(c) was upheld when the
defendant was found with a “heavy duty 9 millimeter firearm” and
nineteen hits of crack on his person while he ran down the street.163
In that case, the Fourth Circuit also stated that physically carrying
a firearm during a drug trafficking crime will always warrant a
conviction under the “possession” prong of § 924(c) because
“carrying a firearm always serves to protect the holder.”164
Despite these general observations, conviction is by no means
a certainty under the Murray/Ceballos-Torres factor test.  This is
reflected in the facts of Murray, as the court of appeals noted that
conviction under section 11.61.195 was unlikely for Murray because
he had stated that he purchased the gun for his girlfriend’s
protection and that he looked in a number of places before
determining where the gun was located.165  In the court’s eyes, these
facts tended to indicate that Murray did not possess the firearm in
furtherance of his drug felony.166
VI.  THE FUTURE OF SECTION 11.61.195
For better or worse, the court of appeals has tied the fate of
section 11.61.195 to the fate of the Ceballos-Torres interpretation
of the “in furtherance” standard of § 924(c).  As it currently stands,
this outcome seems to be the most beneficial for Alaska law.  The
court of appeals saw the similarities in the federal and state statutes
and adopted a test that provides a reasonable amount of guidance
to any trial court judge considering a violation of section 11.61.195.
Effectively, this eliminates most of the ambiguities that may have
resulted from previous interpretations of Alaska law.  On the
federal side, however, a latent ambiguity exists that may serve to
change the nature of the Ceballos-Torres test altogether.
161. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000).
162. United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376-77 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Mackey, 265
F.3d at 462-63.
163. United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 2002).
164. Id. at 706.
165. Murray v. State, 54 P.3d 821, 825 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
166. Id.
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As the Ceballos-Torres court was formulating its factors, it
openly worried about the effect that its interpretation of “in
furtherance” would have on the rest of § 924(c).167  Specifically, the
Fifth Circuit recognized that its interpretation of the “possession in
furtherance” prong appeared to render other parts of the statute
superfluous.168  This conflict is centered on two parts of § 924(c): the
“during and in relation to” clause and the “uses or carries” clause.
On its face, it would appear that the “possession in furtherance
of” standard under § 924(c) completely envelops every instance of
using or carrying a weapon during and in relation to a drug
offense.169  The Ceballos-Torres court expressed uncertainty as to
whether Congress intended to go that far, but found no evidence to
the contrary.170  This ambiguity may lead to future action by the
Supreme Court if the Court determines that the difference is
sufficiently problematic.171  Obviously, this would have implications
for the Murray court’s framework.  Furthermore, it would
implicate the structure of Alaska law, which seems to exhibit the
same ambiguity as the federal law:  Specifically, in Murray, the
court of appeals’ construction of the possession statute (section
11.61.195) seems to bring all cases that might arise under the use
statute (section 11.61.190) under its ambit.  This problem is
exacerbated by the relative dearth of case law interpreting the use
statute.  Accordingly, under the current framework, Alaska courts
will have to be especially aware of new developments in the
jurisprudence of § 924(c).
To prevent this problem, the legislature should strongly
consider repealing section 11.61.190 and amending section
11.61.195 to cover both active employment or use and “regular”
possession of the weapon.  Eliminating section 11.61.190 would
minimize any negative effects of a future Supreme Court decision
construing the differences between the “use or carry” and
“possession” standards contained in § 924(c).  Accordingly, Alaska
could adhere to its test without having to deal with changes in
federal law.  An amended statute would also lessen the burden of
carefully tracking developments in § 924(c) jurisprudence that the
Alaska judiciary would otherwise have to undertake.  Additionally,
any legislative intent to impose higher penalties could be dealt with
within the framework of a single statute.  This unified statute
would recognize the reality that almost every use of a weapon
167. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2000).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 415.
171. United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2000).
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under the statute also constitutes a possession of the weapon in
furtherance of a drug offense.
This analysis may become moot, however, if the interpretation
of section 11.61.195 in Murray was not what the legislature
envisioned when it enacted the statute. When deciding Murray, the
court of appeals noted that it believed the legislature intended to
punish those who possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug
offense.172  If this was indeed the legislature’s intent, the legislature
may want to consider amending the language of section 11.61.195
to explicitly include the “in furtherance” standard.  If this was not
the legislature’s intent, it should consider amending the statute as
soon as possible in order to reflect its true intent.
VII.  CONCLUSION
In Murray, the Court of Appeals of Alaska effectively
incorporated by reference the entire history of § 924(c) by tying its
own possession test to that of the federal courts.  This action may
or may not have future implications for Alaska law, but it is clear
that, for now, trial courts have a more complete indication of the
tests they should use and the factors they should consider when
determining whether a nexus exists between a weapon and a drug
charge.  Alaska courts, as well as the legislature, should build upon
this foundation in order to guarantee that this test remains stable
and reliable.
John D. Fred
172. Murray v. State, 54 P.3d 821, 824 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
